Law of Limitation and Delay Condonation
Delay Has To Be Condoned Irrespective Of Length Of De0lay If There Is ‘Sufficient Cause’ Mool Chandra v. UOI-2024 .
“It is not the length of delay that would be required to be considered while examining the plea for condonation of delay, it is the cause for delay which has been propounded will have to be examined. If the cause for delay would fall within the four corners of “sufficient cause”, irrespective of the length of delay same deserves to be condoned. However, if the cause shown is insufficient, irrespective of the period of delay, same would not be condoned.”
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. reported in (1987) 2 SCC,107
The above decision expressing the intention of justice-oriented approach percolating down to all the courts was rendered nearly three decades ago but unfortunately, the case on hand demonstrates the pervading insensitive approach, which apart from continuing the agony of the litigants concerned has also unnecessarily burdened the judicial hierarchy which after going through the entire process will have to set the clock back, at this distant point in time and prolong their agony.
SLP (C) No. 27901 / 2005, SC
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that the judiciary is espected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
Supreme court in the case of DDA Vs Tejpal & Ors., 2024 re-interated in para-43 of the judgement that;
“On account of the third wave of Pandemic, the aforementioned order dated 23.09.2021 was finally modified on 10.01.2022, with a total period of approximately 716 days between 15.03.2020-28.02.2022 being excluded from the operation of limitation.