The law related to the proof beyond all reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocent of accused till proven guilty.
This case law came from this first case of Woolmington v DPP [1935] UKHL 1 is a landmark case in English criminal law that established the legal principle of the presumption of innocence.
The case involved a man named Reginald Woolmington, who was charged with the murder of his wife. At trial, Woolmington argued that the shooting had been an accident, but the jury found him guilty of murder. Woolmington appealed to the House of Lords.
The House of Lords held that the trial judge had misdirected the jury on the issue of the burden of proof. The Court ruled that in criminal cases, the burden of proof is always on the prosecution to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and it is not for the defendant to prove his innocence.
In reaching its decision, the House of Lords emphasised that the presumption of innocence is a vital principle in any civilised system of justice. The court stated that “Throughout the web of the English criminal law, one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception.”
The principle of the presumption of innocence has since become a cornerstone of criminal justice systems around the world. It ensures that the state cannot arbitrarily deprive individuals of their liberty or impose criminal sanctions without first proving their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Miller Vs Minister of Pensions [1947]2 ALL ER 372, it was held that the prosecution evidence should be of such standard as to leave no other logical explanation to be derived apart from the fact that the accused committed the offence.
The Suprem Court of in K. Gopal Reddy Vs State of Andhra Pradesh decide on 22-11-1978 guidelined as ;
Criminal Law – Murder – Reversal by High Court of order of acquittal by Sessions Court in appeal – Confirmed by Supreme Court – Principles governing orders to be passed in appeals against acquittal – Change in concept emphasised – Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 302 and Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 378 – Appeal – Acquittal – Possibility of two views – Justification for interference by appellate court.
At one time is was thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for “substantial and compelling reasons” only and Courts used to launch on a search to discover those “substantial and compelling reasons.”
However, the ‘formulae’ of “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficiently cogent reasons” and “strong reason” and the search for them were abandoned as a result of the pronouncement of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715. In Sanwat Singh’s case this Court harked back to the principles unciated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. Emperor, 61 Ind App 398 : AIR 1934 PC 227 (2), and re affirmed those principles. After Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan this court has consistently recognised the right of the Appellate Court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, bearing in mind the considerations mentioned by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup’s case. Occationally phrases like ‘manifestly illegal’, ‘grossly unjust’, have be ensued to describe the orders of acquittal which warrant interference. But, such expressions have been used more, as flourishes of language, to emphasise the reluctance of the Appellate Court to interfere with an order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the Appellate Court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion. In some cases (Ramabhupala Reddy v. The State of A.P., AIR 1971 SC 460; Bhim Singh Rup Singh v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 286 etc.), it has been said that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh’s case may be added the further principle that “if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of the trial Court.” If two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an accused person many claim, must be reasonable. “A reasonable doubt”, it has been remarked, “does not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may flit through the minds of any of us about almost anything at some time or other, it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict; it means a real doubt, a doubt founded upon reason. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence of course it is possible but not in the least probable’ the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice. Benefit of doubt – Principle for appreciation of evidence – Scope of requirement of proof beyond doubt does not take into account remote possibility of innocence.