Suppression of Material Facts is a fraud, abuse of process of law etc.
Law is well settled that the fact suppressed must be material in the sense that it would have an effect on the merits of the case. The concept
of suppression or non-disclosure of facts transcends mere concealment; it necessitates the deliberate withholding of material facts—those of such critical import that their absence would render any decision unjust. Material facts, in this context, refer to those facts that possess the potential to significantly influence the decision-making process or alter its trajectory. This principle is not intended to arm one party with a weapon of technicality over its adversary but rather serves as a crucial safeguard against the abuse of the judicial process.
A Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd v. State of Bihar and others, (2004) 7 SCC 166.
Held that a fact suppressed must be material; that is, if it had not been suppressed, it would have influenced the merits of the case. It was held thus: “13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken […] 14. Assuming that the explanation given by the appellant that the suit had been filed by one of the Directors of the Company without the knowledge of the Director who almost simultaneously approached the High Court under Article 226 is unbelievable (sic), the question still remains whether the filing of the suit can be said to be a fact material to the disposal of the writ petition on merits. We think not. […] the fact that a suit had already been filed by the appellant was not such a fact the suppression of which could have affected the final disposal of the writ petition on merits.”
Further, a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court in Arunima Baruah v. UOI and others, (2007) 6 SCC 120
following the aforesaid dictum, held thus: “12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression where of would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question.”
Counsel on behalf of the landowners have contended that the conduct of the appellants disqualifies them from seeking any relief. They assert that the appellants filed the present appeals, specifically under Group B.1, without disclosing that civil appeals filed by another appellant/authority against the same impugned order has already been dismissed. Furthermore, this action is deemed as providing an inaccurate declaration under Order XXI Rule 3(2) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.
Nevertheless, we have carefully considered the orders issued during the first round of litigation, which are alleged to have been suppressed. Despite reviewing these orders, we find no compelling reason to dismiss the appeals based solely on the prior dismissal of appeals filed by some other appellant/authority.
